@@ -3452,6 +3452,145 @@ impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
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!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
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}
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+ fn commitment_signed_check<L: Deref>(
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+ &self, funding: &FundingScope, holder_commitment_point: &HolderCommitmentPoint,
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+ msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L,
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+ ) -> Result<LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo, ChannelError>
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+ where
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+ L::Target: Logger,
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+ {
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+ if self.channel_state.is_quiescent() {
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+ return Err(ChannelError::WarnAndDisconnect("Got commitment_signed message while quiescent".to_owned()));
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+ }
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+ if !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
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+ return Err(ChannelError::close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
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+ }
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+ if self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
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+ return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
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+ }
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+ if self.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
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+ return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
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+ }
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+
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+ let funding_script = funding.get_funding_redeemscript();
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+
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+ let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(funding, holder_commitment_point.current_point());
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+
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+ let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(funding, holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger);
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+ let commitment_txid = {
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+ let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
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+ let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
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+ let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, funding.get_value_satoshis());
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+
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+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
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+ log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
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+ log_bytes!(funding.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
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+ log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.channel_id());
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+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &funding.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
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+ return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
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+ }
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+ bitcoin_tx.txid
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+ };
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+ let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
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+
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+ // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
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+ // they can actually afford the new fee now.
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+ let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
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+ update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
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+ } else { false };
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+ if update_fee {
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+ debug_assert!(!funding.is_outbound());
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+ let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = funding.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
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+ if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
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+ return Err(ChannelError::close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
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+ }
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+ }
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+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
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+ {
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+ if funding.is_outbound() {
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+ let projected_commit_tx_info = funding.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
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+ *funding.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
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+ if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
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+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
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+ + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
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+ if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
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+ && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
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+ && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
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+ && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
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+ assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
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+ return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
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+ }
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+
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+ // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
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+ // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
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+ // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
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+ // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
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+ // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
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+ // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
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+ #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
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+ let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
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+ #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
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+ use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
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+ // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
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+ let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
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+ separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
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+ }
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+
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+ let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
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+ let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
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+ for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
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+ if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
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+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
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+ funding.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.channel_type,
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+ &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
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+
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+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.channel_type, &keys);
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+ let htlc_sighashtype = if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
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+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
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+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
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+ log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
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+ encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.channel_id());
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+ if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
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+ return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
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+ }
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+ if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
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+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
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+ }
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+ } else {
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+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
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+ }
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+ if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
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+ if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
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+ nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
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+ }
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+
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+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
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+ commitment_stats.tx,
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+ msg.signature,
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+ msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
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+ &funding.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
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+ funding.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
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+ );
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+
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+ self.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
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+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
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+
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+ Ok(LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
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+ commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
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+ htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
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+ nondust_htlc_sources,
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+ })
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+ }
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+
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/// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
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/// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
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/// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
@@ -5494,145 +5633,10 @@ impl<SP: Deref> FundedChannel<SP> where
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Ok(channel_monitor)
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}
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- fn commitment_signed_check<L: Deref>(&self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo, ChannelError>
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- where L::Target: Logger
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- {
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- if self.context.channel_state.is_quiescent() {
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- return Err(ChannelError::WarnAndDisconnect("Got commitment_signed message while quiescent".to_owned()));
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- }
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- if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
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- return Err(ChannelError::close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
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- }
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- if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
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- return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
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- }
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- if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
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- return Err(ChannelError::close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
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- }
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-
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- let funding_script = self.funding.get_funding_redeemscript();
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-
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- let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(&self.funding, self.holder_commitment_point.current_point());
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-
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- let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(&self.funding, self.holder_commitment_point.transaction_number(), &keys, true, false, logger);
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- let commitment_txid = {
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- let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
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- let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
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- let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.funding.get_value_satoshis());
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-
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- log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
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- log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
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- log_bytes!(self.funding.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
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- log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
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- if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.funding.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
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- return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
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- }
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- bitcoin_tx.txid
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- };
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- let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
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-
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- // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
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- // they can actually afford the new fee now.
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- let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
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- update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
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- } else { false };
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- if update_fee {
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- debug_assert!(!self.funding.is_outbound());
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- let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.funding.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
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- if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
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- return Err(ChannelError::close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
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- }
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- }
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- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
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- {
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- if self.funding.is_outbound() {
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- let projected_commit_tx_info = self.funding.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
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- *self.funding.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
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- if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
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- let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
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- + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
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- if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
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- && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
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- && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
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- && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
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- assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
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- }
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- }
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- }
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- }
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-
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- if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
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- return Err(ChannelError::close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
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- }
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-
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- // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
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- // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
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- // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
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- // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
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- // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
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- // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
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- #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
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- let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
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- #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
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- use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
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- // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
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- let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
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- separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
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- }
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-
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- let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
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- let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
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- for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
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- if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
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- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
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- self.funding.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
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- &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
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-
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- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
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- let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
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- let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
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- log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
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- log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
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- encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
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- if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
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- return Err(ChannelError::close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
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- }
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- if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
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- htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
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- }
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- } else {
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- htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
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- }
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- if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
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- if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
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- nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
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- }
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- }
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- debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
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- }
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-
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- let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
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- commitment_stats.tx,
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- msg.signature,
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- msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
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- &self.funding.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
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- self.funding.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
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- );
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-
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- self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
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- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
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-
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- Ok(LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
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- commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
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- htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
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- nondust_htlc_sources,
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- })
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- }
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-
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pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
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where L::Target: Logger
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{
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- let commitment_tx_info = self.commitment_signed_check(msg, logger)?;
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+ let commitment_tx_info = self.context. commitment_signed_check(&self.funding, &self.holder_commitment_point, msg, logger)?;
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// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
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let mut need_commitment = false;
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