Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. #445
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TheBlueMatt
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lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
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| let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), | ||
| &SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 3)).unwrap()); | ||
| let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 1); |
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Could what's going on with (1 << 48) - 3) and (1 << 48) - 3) be made more explicit somehow? Not sure of the best way to do it. Could be as simple as well named variables... or better yet an abstraction that hides this math but makes it clear that the commitment number was advanced one too many times.
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A bit better? I copied the INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER const here to make the math clear.
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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine (and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the channel in such a case and move on.
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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.