Skip to content

Tell ChannelMonitors about HTLCs fulfilled after channel close #611

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Merged
Merged
Show file tree
Hide file tree
Changes from all commits
Commits
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension

Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ impl chain::Watch for TestChainMonitor {
};
let mut deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::
read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1)).unwrap().1;
deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &&TestBroadcaster {}, &self.logger).unwrap();
deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator{}, &self.logger).unwrap();
let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
deserialized_monitor.serialize_for_disk(&mut ser).unwrap();
map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
},
Some(orig_monitor) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
let update_res = orig_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger);
let update_res = orig_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &self.broadcaster, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
if let Err(e) = &update_res {
log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor: {:?}", e);
}
Expand Down
192 changes: 149 additions & 43 deletions lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -64,14 +64,29 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
/// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
/// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
/// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
/// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
///
/// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
/// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
/// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
///
/// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
/// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
/// its docs for more details.
///
/// [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]: constant.CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID.html
pub update_id: u64,
}

/// If:
/// (1) a channel has been force closed and
/// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
/// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
/// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
/// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
/// force-close.
pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = std::u64::MAX;

impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
self.update_id.write(w)?;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1144,8 +1159,47 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {

/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());

// If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
// First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
}
if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
return;
}
}
if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
return;
}
}

// Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
// claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
// Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
// *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
// holder commitment transactions.
if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx);
self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, None, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
}
}
}

pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
Expand All @@ -1162,26 +1216,45 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
/// itself.
///
/// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
L::Target: Logger,
pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
// ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
// preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
// like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
// access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
match updates.updates[0] {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
Copy link

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

No coverage for this ? All test pass.

diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
index 5faa7f96..28832c03 100644
--- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
                if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
                        match updates.updates[0] {
                                ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
-                               _ => panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
+                               _ => {} //panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage"),
                        }
                        assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
                }

Copy link
Contributor Author

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Thanks, opened #751

}
assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
} else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
}
for update in updates.updates.iter() {
match update {
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone())?
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger),
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?,
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret)?
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
if *should_broadcast {
self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1425,39 +1498,55 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
}

let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
claimable_outpoints.push(req);
}

}
(claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
}

fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<ClaimRequest> {
let mut claims = Vec::new();
if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
// If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
// per-commitment point
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
// If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
// their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
// them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
} else { None };
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
self.counterparty_payment_script = {
// Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
// script_pubkey version
let payment_hash160 = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script()
};

// Then, try to find htlc outputs
for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
if let Some(transaction) = tx {
if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
return claims; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
}
let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
let preimage =
if htlc.offered {
if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
Some(*p)
} else { None }
} else { None };
let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
let witness_data = InputMaterial::CounterpartyHTLC { per_commitment_point: *revocation_point, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key: self.counterparty_tx_cache.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage, htlc: htlc.clone() };
claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
claims.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
}
}
}
}
}
}
(claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
claims
}

/// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1487,9 +1576,11 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
(claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
}

fn broadcast_by_holder_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
// Returns (1) `ClaimRequest`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
// broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
// script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());

let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
Expand All @@ -1508,11 +1599,21 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
} else { None },
amount: htlc.amount_msat,
}});
watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
}
}

(claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
(claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
}

// Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
}
}
watch_outputs
}

/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1547,10 +1648,10 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
}

macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
($updates: expr) => {
($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
claim_requests = $updates.0;
watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.2;
self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
}
}

Expand All @@ -1560,14 +1661,16 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
is_holder_tx = true;
log_trace!(logger, "Got latest holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
append_onchain_update!(res);
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
} else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
is_holder_tx = true;
log_trace!(logger, "Got previous holder commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
let mut res = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(tx, holder_tx);
append_onchain_update!(res);
let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx);
let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
}
}

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1735,7 +1838,8 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_holder_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1763,7 +1867,7 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
}
}

self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, Some(height), &&*broadcaster, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger);
self.last_block_hash = block_hash;

// Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -2486,16 +2590,18 @@ mod tests {
use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;

#[test]
fn test_prune_preimages() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });

let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -2571,7 +2677,7 @@ mod tests {
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
}

// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
Expand Down
Loading