Update documentation related to the recent cmd.exe fix

library/std/src/os/windows/process.rs

@@ -199,14 +199,14 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
 
     /// Append literal text to the command line without any quoting or escaping.
     ///
-    /// This is useful for passing arguments to applications which doesn't follow
+    /// This is useful for passing arguments to applications that don't follow
     /// the standard C run-time escaping rules, such as `cmd.exe /c`.
     ///
-    /// # Bat files
+    /// # Batch files
     ///
-    /// Note the `cmd /c` command line has slightly different escaping rules then bat files
+    /// Note the `cmd /c` command line has slightly different escaping rules than batch files
     /// themselves. If possible, it may be better to write complex arguments to a temporary
-    /// .bat file, with appropriate escaping, and simply run that using:
+    /// `.bat` file, with appropriate escaping, and simply run that using:
     ///
     /// ```no_run
     /// # use std::process::Command;
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
     ///
     /// # Example
     ///
-    /// Run a bat script using both trusted and untrusted arguments.
+    /// Run a batch script using both trusted and untrusted arguments.
     ///
     /// ```no_run
     /// #[cfg(windows)]
@@ -241,9 +241,10 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
     ///     if !user_name.chars().all(|c| c.is_alphanumeric()) {
     ///         return Err(Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "invalid user name"));
     ///     }
-    ///     // now we've checked the user name, let's add that too.
-    ///     cmd_args.push(' ');
-    ///     cmd_args.push_str(&format!("--user {user_name}"));
+    ///
+    ///     // now we have validated the user name, let's add that too.
+    ///     cmd_args.push_str(" --user ");
+    ///     cmd_args.push_str(user_name);
     ///
     ///     // call cmd.exe and return the output
     ///     Command::new("cmd.exe")
@@ -287,25 +288,37 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
     #[unstable(feature = "windows_process_extensions_async_pipes", issue = "98289")]
     fn async_pipes(&mut self, always_async: bool) -> &mut process::Command;
 
-    /// Sets a raw attribute on the command, providing extended configuration options for Windows processes.
+    /// Set a raw attribute on the command, providing extended configuration options for Windows
+    /// processes.
+    ///
+    /// This method allows you to specify custom attributes for a child process on Windows systems
+    /// using raw attribute values. Raw attributes provide extended configurability for process
+    /// creation, but their usage can be complex and potentially unsafe.
     ///
-    /// This method allows you to specify custom attributes for a child process on Windows systems using raw attribute values.
-    /// Raw attributes provide extended configurability for process creation, but their usage can be complex and potentially unsafe.
+    /// The `attribute` parameter specifies the raw attribute to be set, while the `value`
+    /// parameter holds the value associated with that attribute. Please refer to the
+    /// [`windows-rs` documentation] or the [Win32 API documentation] for detailed information
+    /// about available attributes and their meanings.
     ///
-    /// The `attribute` parameter specifies the raw attribute to be set, while the `value` parameter holds the value associated with that attribute.
-    /// Please refer to the [`windows-rs`](https://microsoft.github.io/windows-docs-rs/doc/windows/) documentation or the [`Win32 API documentation`](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute) for detailed information about available attributes and their meanings.
+    /// [`windows-rs` documentation]: https://microsoft.github.io/windows-docs-rs/doc/windows/
+    /// [Win32 API documentation]: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute
     ///
     /// # Note
     ///
     /// The maximum number of raw attributes is the value of [`u32::MAX`].
-    /// If this limit is exceeded, the call to [`process::Command::spawn`] will return an `Error` indicating that the maximum number of attributes has been exceeded.
+    /// If this limit is exceeded, the call to [`process::Command::spawn`] will return an `Error`
+    /// indicating that the maximum number of attributes has been exceeded.
+    ///
     /// # Safety
     ///
-    /// The usage of raw attributes is potentially unsafe and should be done with caution. Incorrect attribute values or improper configuration can lead to unexpected behavior or errors.
+    /// The usage of raw attributes is potentially unsafe and should be done with caution.
+    /// Incorrect attribute values or improper configuration can lead to unexpected behavior or
+    /// errors.
     ///
     /// # Example
     ///
-    /// The following example demonstrates how to create a child process with a specific parent process ID using a raw attribute.
+    /// The following example demonstrates how to create a child process with a specific parent
+    /// process ID using a raw attribute.
     ///
     /// ```rust
     /// #![feature(windows_process_extensions_raw_attribute)]
@@ -339,7 +352,9 @@ pub trait CommandExt: Sealed {
     ///
     /// # Safety Note
     ///
-    /// Remember that improper use of raw attributes can lead to undefined behavior or security vulnerabilities. Always consult the documentation and ensure proper attribute values are used.
+    /// Remember that improper use of raw attributes can lead to undefined behavior or security
+    /// vulnerabilities. Always consult the documentation and ensure proper attribute values are
+    /// used.
     #[unstable(feature = "windows_process_extensions_raw_attribute", issue = "114854")]
     unsafe fn raw_attribute<T: Copy + Send + Sync + 'static>(
         &mut self,

library/std/src/process.rs

@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@
 //!
 //! # Windows argument splitting
 //!
-//! On Unix systems arguments are passed to a new process as an array of strings
-//! but on Windows arguments are passed as a single commandline string and it's
+//! On Unix systems arguments are passed to a new process as an array of strings,
+//! but on Windows arguments are passed as a single commandline string and it is
 //! up to the child process to parse it into an array. Therefore the parent and
 //! child processes must agree on how the commandline string is encoded.
 //!
@@ -107,26 +107,26 @@
 //! * Use [`raw_arg`] to build a custom commandline. This bypasses the escaping
 //!   rules used by [`arg`] so should be used with due caution.
 //!
-//! `cmd.exe` and `.bat` use non-standard argument parsing and are especially
+//! `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files use non-standard argument parsing and are especially
 //! vulnerable to malicious input as they may be used to run arbitrary shell
 //! commands. Untrusted arguments should be restricted as much as possible.
 //! For examples on handling this see [`raw_arg`].
 //!
-//! ### Bat file special handling
+//! ### Batch file special handling
 //!
 //! On Windows, `Command` uses the Windows API function [`CreateProcessW`] to
-//! spawn new processes. An undocumented feature of this function is that,
+//! spawn new processes. An undocumented feature of this function is that
 //! when given a `.bat` file as the application to run, it will automatically
-//! convert that into running `cmd.exe /c` with the bat file as the next argument.
+//! convert that into running `cmd.exe /c` with the batch file as the next argument.
 //!
 //! For historical reasons Rust currently preserves this behaviour when using
 //! [`Command::new`], and escapes the arguments according to `cmd.exe` rules.
 //! Due to the complexity of `cmd.exe` argument handling, it might not be
-//! possible to safely escape some special chars, and using them will result
+//! possible to safely escape some special characters, and using them will result
 //! in an error being returned at process spawn. The set of unescapeable
-//! special chars might change between releases.
+//! special characters might change between releases.
 //!
-//! Also note that running `.bat` scripts in this way may be removed in the
+//! Also note that running batch scripts in this way may be removed in the
 //! future and so should not be relied upon.
 //!
 //! [`spawn`]: Command::spawn
@@ -655,16 +655,19 @@ impl Command {
     ///
     /// Note that the argument is not passed through a shell, but given
     /// literally to the program. This means that shell syntax like quotes,
-    /// escaped characters, word splitting, glob patterns, variable substitution, etc.
-    /// have no effect.
+    /// escaped characters, word splitting, glob patterns, variable substitution,
+    /// etc. have no effect.
     ///
     /// <div class="warning">
     ///
-    /// On Windows use caution with untrusted inputs. Most applications use the
-    /// standard convention for decoding arguments passed to them. These are safe to use with `arg`.
-    /// However some applications, such as `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files, use a non-standard way of decoding arguments
-    /// and are therefore vulnerable to malicious input.
-    /// In the case of `cmd.exe` this is especially important because a malicious argument can potentially run arbitrary shell commands.
+    /// On Windows, use caution with untrusted inputs. Most applications use the
+    /// standard convention for decoding arguments passed to them. These are safe to
+    /// use with `arg`. However, some applications such as `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files
+    /// use a non-standard way of decoding arguments. They are therefore vulnerable
+    /// to malicious input.
+    ///
+    /// In the case of `cmd.exe` this is especially important because a malicious
+    /// argument can potentially run arbitrary shell commands.
     ///
     /// See [Windows argument splitting][windows-args] for more details
     /// or [`raw_arg`] for manually implementing non-standard argument encoding.
@@ -706,11 +709,14 @@ impl Command {
     ///
     /// <div class="warning">
     ///
-    /// On Windows use caution with untrusted inputs. Most applications use the
-    /// standard convention for decoding arguments passed to them. These are safe to use with `args`.
-    /// However some applications, such as `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files, use a non-standard way of decoding arguments
-    /// and are therefore vulnerable to malicious input.
-    /// In the case of `cmd.exe` this is especially important because a malicious argument can potentially run arbitrary shell commands.
+    /// On Windows, use caution with untrusted inputs. Most applications use the
+    /// standard convention for decoding arguments passed to them. These are safe to
+    /// use with `arg`. However, some applications such as `cmd.exe` and `.bat` files
+    /// use a non-standard way of decoding arguments. They are therefore vulnerable
+    /// to malicious input.
+    ///
+    /// In the case of `cmd.exe` this is especially important because a malicious
+    /// argument can potentially run arbitrary shell commands.
     ///
     /// See [Windows argument splitting][windows-args] for more details
     /// or [`raw_arg`] for manually implementing non-standard argument encoding.