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Scale up CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY to 2 weeks of blocks #1532
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Scale up CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY to 2 weeks of blocks #1532
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Codecov Report
@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #1532 +/- ##
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- Coverage 90.94% 90.91% -0.03%
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Files 80 80
Lines 43469 43469
Branches 43469 43469
==========================================
- Hits 39533 39521 -12
- Misses 3936 3948 +12
Continue to review full report at Codecov.
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Lets hold off merging until 109 for this. |
lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
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// in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to | ||
// scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much, | ||
// while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of | ||
// routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up a LDK node among the first hops. |
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// routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up a LDK node among the first hops. | |
// routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops. |
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Updated.
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This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
cltv_expiry_delta
. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing nodein case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up a LDK node among the first hops.
Also default value of both LND and CLN.